GREECE AND THE ALLIES 1914-1922 DARDANELLES Constantine VENIZELOS Turkey BALKANS
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GREECE AND THE ALLIES 1914-1922 DARDANELLES Constantine VENIZELOS Turkey BALKANS:
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Greece and the Allies
1914-1922
by
G. F. Abbott
(George Frederick Abbott)
With a Preface by Admiral Mark Kerr
Late Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Hellenic Navy
and Head of the British Naval Mission to Greece
This is the 1922 First Edition (ex-Library)
One the rarest books in English describing affairs in Greece during the First World War.
“In this book the reader will find stated with unprecedented frankness the real causes of the present crisis in the Near East, and an explanation of that paradoxical policy which first worked for the enlargement of Greek power and now seeks its curtailment. The author traces the trouble to its source — the open divergence between M. Venizelos and King Constantine, and the hidden pull of British versus French interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.” [“Methuen’s Announcements”]
“King Constantine voluntarily presented to the British Admiralty through Admiral Kerr the plans for the taking of the Dardanelles which his Staff had elaborated, and for a l0ng time afterwards continued to supply the British Government, through the same channel, with information from his secret service . . . M. Venizelos, hating monarchy, yet unable to dispense with it; despising democracy, yet obliged to render it lip-homage; maintained his own unlimited power by the same system of apparent liberty and real violence by which he had attained it.”
Front cover and spine
Further images of this book are shown below
21 Chapters
Afterword
Index
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Greece and the Allies 1914-1922
Preface by Mark Kerr
THE late convulsions in Greece and Turkey, and the consequent revival of all the mis-statements which, during the War, flowed from ignorance or malice, render the publication of this book particularly opportune.
Mr. Abbott deals with his subject in all its aspects, and presents for the first time to the British public a complete and coherent view of the complicated circumstances that made Greece, during the War, the battle-ground of rival interests and intrigues, from which have grown the present troubles.
In this book we get a clear account of the little-understood relations between the Greek and the Serb ; of the altitude of Greece towards the Central Powers and the Entente ; of the dealings between Greece and the Entente and the complications that ensued therefrom. Mr. Abbott traces the evil to its source—the hidden pull of British versus French interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the open antagonism between M. Venizelos and King Constantine.
All these subjects are of acute interest, and not the least interesting is the last.
The persecution of King Constantine by the Press of the Allied countries, with some few good exceptions, has been one of the most tragic affairs since the Dreyfus case. Its effect on the state of Europe during and since the War is remarkable. If King Constantine\'s advice had been followed, and the Greek plan for the taking of the Dardanelles had been carried out, the war would probably have been shortened by a very considerable period, Bulgaria and Rumania could have been kept out of the War, and probably the Russian Revolution and collapse would not have taken place ; for, instead of having Turkey to assist Bulgaria, the Allied forces would have been between and separating these two countries.
In this case King Constantine would not have been exiled from his country, and consequently he would not have permitted the Greek Army to be sent to Asia Minor, which he always stated would ruin Greece, as the country was not rich enough or strong enough to maintain an overseas colony next to an hereditary enemy like the Turk.
It is illuminating to remember that the Greek King\'s policy was fully endorsed by the only competent authorities who had a full knowledge of the subject, which was a purely military one. These were the late Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, the British Admiral at the head of the Naval Mission in Greece, and Colonel Sir Thomas Cuninghame, British Military Attaché in Athens; but the advice tendered by these three officers was disregarded in favour of that given by the civilians, M. Venizelos and the Allied Ministers.
Mr. Abbott\'s book will do much to enlighten a misled public as to the history of Greece during the last nine years, and many documents which have not hitherto been before the public are quoted by him from the official originals, to prove the case.
For the sake of truth and justice, which used to flourish in Great Britain, I hope that this book will be read by everyone who has the welfare of the British Empire at heart.
Mark Kerr
4 October, 1922
Author’s Preface
AS this work goes to press, the British Empire finds itself forced to vindicate its position in the East: a position purchased at the cost of much blood and treasure during the war, to be jeopardized after the conclusion of peace by the defeat of Greece and the defection of France.
In the following pages the reader will find the sequence of events which have inevitably led up to this crisis : an account of transactions hitherto obscured and distorted by every species of misrepresentation and every known artifice for manipulating public opinion.
The volume is not a hasty essay produced to exploit an ephemeral situation. It embodies the fruit of investigations laboriously carried on through six years. A slight account of the earlier events appeared as far back as the winter of 1916 in a book entitled, Turkey, Greece, and the Great Powers : that was my first effort to place the subject In its true perspective. The results were interesting. I was honoured by the reproaches of several private and by the reprobation of several public critics ; some correspondents favoured me with their anonymous scurrility, and some bigots relieved me of their acquaintance. On the other hand, there were people who, in the midst of a maelstrom of passion, retained their respect for facts.
I pursued the subject further in a weekly journal. Two of my contributions saw the light; the third was suppressed by the Authorities. Its suppression furnished material for a debate in Parliament: \" This is a cleverly written article,\" said Mr. John Dillon, \" and I cannot find in it a single word which justifies suppression. All that one can find in it is that it states certain facts which the Government do not like to be known, not that they injure the military situation in the least, but that they show that the Government, in the opinion of the writer, made certain very bad blunders.\" The Home Secretary\'s answer was typical of departmental dialectics: \" It is inconceivable to me,\" he declared, \" that the Government would venture to say to the Press, or indicate to it in any way, \' This is our view. Publish it. If you do not, you will suffer.\' \" What the Government did, in effect, say to the Editor of the National Weekly was: \" This is not our view. Publish it not. If you do, you will suffer.\"
With an innocence perhaps pardonable in one who was too intent on the evolution of the world drama to follow the daily development of war-time prohibitions, I next essayed to present to the public through the medium of a book the truth which had been banned from the columns of a magazine. The manuscript of that work, much fingered by the printer, now lies before me, and together with it a letter from the publisher stating that the Authorities had forofferden its publication on pain of proceedings \" under 27 (b) of the Defence of the Realm Regulations.\"
And so it came about that not until now has it been possible for the voice of facts to refute the fables dictated by interest and accepted by credulity. The delay had its advantages: it gave the story, through the natural progress of events, a completeness which otherwise it would have lacked, and enabled me to test its accuracy on every point by a fresh visit to Greece and by reference to sources previously inaccessible, such as the Greek State Papers and the self-revealing publications of persons directly concerned in the transactions here related.
I venture to hope that so thorough an inquiry will convey some new information respecting these transactions even to those who are best acquainted with their general course. If they find nothing attractive in the style of the book, they may find perhaps something useful, something that will deserve their serious reflection, in the matter of it. For let it not be said that a story starting in 1914 is ancient history. Unless one studies the record of Allied action in Greece from the very beginning, he cannot approach with any clear understanding the present crisis— a struggle between Greeks and Turks on the surface, but at bottom a conflict between French and British policies affecting the vital interests of the British Empire.
G. F. A.
5 October, 1922
Besides information acquired at first hand, my material is mainly drawn from the following sources :
Greek State Papers now utilized for the first time. White Book, published by the Government of M. Venizelos under the title, \" Diplomatika Engrapha, 1913-1917,\" 2nd edition, Athens, 1920.
Orations, delivered in the Greek Chamber in August, 1917, by M. Venizelos, his followers, MM. Repoulis, Politis, and Kafandaris, and his opponents, MM. Stratos and Kallis. The Greek text (\" Agoreuseis, etc.,\" Athens, 1917) and the English translation (\" A Report of Speeches, etc,\" London, 1918), give them all, though the speech of M. Stratos only in summary. The French translation (\" Discours, etc., Traduction de M. Leon Maccas, autorisee par le Gouvemement Grec,\" Paris, 1917) curiously omits both the Opposition speeches.
Skouloudis\'s Apantesis, 1917; Apologia, 1919 ; Semeioseis, 1921. The first of these publications is the ex-Premier\'s Reply to statements made in the Greek Chamber by M. Venizelos and others in August, 1917 ; the second is his Defence ; the third is a collection of Notes concerning transactions in which he took part. All three are of the highest value for the eventful period of the Skouloudis Administration from November, 1915, to June, 1916.
Journal Officiel, 24-30 October, 1919, containing a full report of the Secret Committee of the French Chamber which sat from 16 June to 22 June, 1916.
Next in importance, though not inferior in historic interest, come some personal narratives, of which I have also availed myself, by leading French actors in the drama : Du Fournet: \" Souvenirs de Guerre d\'un Amiral, 1914-1-916.\" By Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, Paris, 1920. Sarrail: \" Mon Commandement en Orient, 1916-1918.\" By General Sarrail, Paris, 1920.
Regnault: \" La Conquete d\'Athenes, Juin-Juillet, 1917.\" By General Regnault, Paris, 1920.
Deville: \" L\'Entente, la Grece et la Bulgarie. Notes d\'histoire et souvenirs.\" By Gabriel Deville, Paris, 1919. The author was French Minister at Athens till August, 1915, and the portions of his work which deal with his own experiences are worth consulting.
Jonnart: \" M. Jonnart en Grece et l\'abdication de Constantin.\" By Raymond Recouly, Paris, 1918. Though not written by the High Commissioner himself, this account may be regarded as a semi-official record of his mission.
The only English publications of equal value, though of much more limited bearing upon the subject of this work, which have appeared so far are:
The Dardanelles Commission Reports (Cd. 8490 ; Cd. 8502 ; Cmd. 371), and the Life of Lord Kitchener, by Sir George Arthur, Vol. Ill, London, 1920.
Some trustworthy contributions to the study of these events have also been made by several unofficial narratives, to which the reader is referred for details on particular episodes. The absence of reference to certain other narratives is deliberate.
Greece and the Allies 1914-1922
Introduction
Ingenious scholars, surveying life from afar, are apt to interpret historical events as the outcome of impersonal forces which shape the course of nations unknown to themselves. This is an impressive theory, but it will not bear close scrutiny. Human nature everywhere responds to the influence of personality. In Greece this response is more marked than anywhere else. No people in the world has been so completely dominated by personal figures and suffered so grievously from their feuds, since the day when strife first parted Atreides, king of men, and god-like Achilles.
The outbreak of the European War found Greece under the sway of King Constantine and his Premier Eleutherios Venizelos; and her history during that troubled era Inevitably centres round these two personalities.
By the triumphant conduct of the campaigns of 1912 and 1913, King Constantine had more than effaced the memory of his defeat in 1897. His victories ministered to the national lust for power and formed an earnest of the glory that was yet to come to Greece. Henceforth a halo of military romance—a thing especially dear to the hearts of men—shone about the head of Constantine; and his grateful country bestowed upon him the title of Stratelates. In town mansions and village huts men\'s mouths were filled with his praise : one dwelt on his dauntless courage, another on his strategic genius, a third on his sympathetic recognition of the claims of the common soldier, whose hardships he shared, and for whose life he evinced a far greater solicitude than for his own.
But it was not only as a leader of armies that King Constantine appealed to the hearts of his countrymen. They loved to explain to strangers the reason of the name Koumbaros or \"Gossip,\" by which they commonly called him. It was not so much, they would say, that he had stood godfather to the children born to his soldiers during the campaigns, but rather that his relations with the rank and file of the people at large were marked by the intimate interest of a personal companion.
In peace, as in war, he seemed a prince born to lead a democratic people. With his tall, virile figure, and a handsome face in which strength and dignity were happily blended with simplicity, he had a manner of address which was very engaging: his words, few, simple, soldier-like, produced a wonderful effect; they were the words of one who meant and felt what he said: they went straight to the hearer\'s heart because they came straight from the speaker\'s.
Qualities of a very different sort had enabled M. Venizelos to impose himself upon the mind of the Greek nation, and to make his name current in the Chancelleries of the world.
Having begun life as an obscure lawyer in Crete, he had risen through a series of political convulsions to high notability in his native island; and in 1909 a similar convulsion in Greece—brought about not without his collaboration—opened to him a wider sphere of activity. The moment was singularly opportune.
The discontent of the Greek people at the chronic mismanagement of their affairs had been quickened by the Turkish Revolution into something like despair. Bulgaria had exploited that upheaval by annexing Eastern Rumelia : Greece had failed to annex Crete, and ran the risk, if the Young Turks\' experiment succeeded, of seeing the fulfilment of all her national aspirations frustrated for ever. A group of military malcontents in touch with the Cretan leader translated the popular feeling into action : a revolt against the reign of venality and futility which had for so many years paralyzed every effort, which had sometimes sacrificed and always subordinated the interests of the nation to the interests of faction, and now left Greece a prey to Bulgarian and Ottoman ambition. The old politicians who were the cause of the ill obviously could not effect a cure. A new man was needed — a man free from the deadening influences of a corrupt past — a man daring enough to initiate a new course and tenacious enough to posh on with inexorable purpose to the goal.
During the first period of his career, M. Venizelos had been a capable organizer of administrative departments no less than a clever manipulator of seditious movements. But he had mainly distinguished himself as a rebel against authority. And it was in the temper of a rebel that he came to Athens. Obstacles, however, external as well as internal, made a subversive enterprise impossible. With the quick adaptability of his nature, he turned into a guardian of established institutions : the foe of revolution and friend of reform. Supported by the Crown, he was able to lift his voice for a \"Revisionist\" above the angry sea of a multitude clamouring for a \" Constituent Assembly.\"
All that was healthy in the political world rallied to the new man ; and the new man did not disappoint the faith placed in him. Through the next two years he stood in every eye as the embodiment of constructive statesmanship. His Government had strength enough in the country to dispense with \" graft.\" The result was a thorough overhauling of the State machinery. Self-distrust founded on past failures vanished. Greece seemed like an invalid healed and ready to face the future. It was a miraculous change for a nation whose political life hitherto had exhibited two traits seldom found combined : the levity of childhood and the indolence of age . . .
Greece and the Allies 1914-1922
Chapter 1
From the moment when the rupture between Austria and Servia, in July, 1914, came to disturb the peace, Greece deliberately adopted an attitude of neutrality, with the proviso that she would go to Servia\'s assistance in case of a Bulgarian attack upon the latter. Such an attitude was considered to be in accordance with the Graeco-Servian Alliance. For, although the Military Convention accompanying the Treaty contained a vague stipulation for mutual support in case of war between one of the allied States and \"a third Power,\" the Treaty itself had as its sole object mutual defence against Bulgaria.
In the opinion of M. Venizelos, her pact did not oblige Greece to go to Servia\'s assistance against Austria, but at most to mobilize 40,000 men. Treaty obligations apart, neutrality was also imposed by practical considerations. It was to the interest of Greece—a matter of self-preservation—not to tolerate a Bulgarian attack on Servia calculated to upset the Balkan balance of power established by the Peace of Bucharest, and she was firmly determined, in concert with Rumania, to oppose such an attack with all her might. But as to Austria, M. Venizelos had to consider whether Greece could or could not offer her ally effective aid, and after consideration he decided that she should not proceed even to the mobilization of 40,000 men, for such a measure might provoke a Bulgarian mobilization and precipitate complications. For the rest, the attitude of Greece in face of Servia\'s war with Austria, M. Venizelos pointed out, corresponded absolutely with the attitude which Servia had taken up in face of Greece\'s recent crisis with Turkey.* On that occasion Greece had obtained from her ally merely moral support, the view taken being that the casus foederis would arise only in the event of Bulgarian intervention.
Accordingly, when the Servian Government asked if it could count on armed assistance from Greece, M. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs under M. Venizelos, answered that the Greek Government was convinced that it fully performed its duty as a friend and ally by adopting, until Bulgaria moved, a policy of most benevolent neutrality. The co-operation of Greece in the war with Austria, far from helping, would harm Servia ; by becoming a belligerent Greece could only offer her ally forces negligible compared with the enemy\'s, while she would inevitably expose Salonica, the only port through which Servia could obtain war material, to an Austrian attack; and, moreover, she would weaken her army which, in the common interest, ought to be kept intact as a check on Bulgaria.
A similar communication, emphasizing the decision to keep out of the conflict, and to intervene in concert with Rumania only should Bulgaria by intervening against Servia jeopardize the status quo established by the Bucharest Treaty—in which case the action of Greece would have a purely Balkan character—was made to the Greek Ministers abroad after a Council held in the Royal Palace under the presidency of the King.
This policy brought King Constantine into sharp collision with one of the Central Powers, whose conceptions in regard to the Balkans had not yet been harmonized. Vienna readily acquiesced in the Greek Government\'s declaration that it could not permit Bulgaria to compromise the Bucharest Treaty, and since by an eventual action against Bulgaria Greece would not quarrel with Austria, the Austrian Government, on its part, promised to abstain from manifesting any solidarity with Bulgaria in the event of a Graeco-Bulgarian war. Not so Berlin.
The German Emperor egotistically presumed to dictate the course which Greece should pursue, and on 31 July he invited King Constantine to join Germany, backing the invitation with every appeal to sentiment and interest he could think of. The memory of his father, who had been assassinated, made it impossible for Constantine to favour the Servian assassins; never would Greece have a better opportunity of emancipating herself, under the protection of the Central Powers, from the tutelage which Russia aimed at exercising over the Balkan Peninsula; if, contrary to the Kaiser\'s expectations, Greece took the other side, she would be exposed to a simultaneous attack from Italy, Bulgaria and Turkey, and by the same token all personal relations between him and Constantine would be broken for ever. He ended with the words : \"I have spoken frankly, and I beg you to let me know your decision without delay and with the same absolute frankness.\"
He had nothing to complain of on that score. King Constantine on 2 August replied that, while it was not the policy of Greece to take an active part in the Austro-Servian conflict, it was equally impossible for her \" to make common cause with the enemies of the Serbs and to fall upon them, since they are our allies. It seems to me that the interests of Greece demand an absolute neutrality and the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans such as it has been created by the Treaty of Bucharest.\" He went on to add that Greece was determined, in concert with Rumania, to prevent Bulgaria from aggrandizing herself at the expense of Servia; if that happened, the balance in the Balkans would be upset and it would bring about the very Russian tutelage which the Kaiser feared. \" This way of thinking,\" he concluded, \" is shared by the whole of my people.\"
What the Kaiser thought of these opinions was summed up in one word on the margin, \"Rubbish.\" This, however, was not meant for his brother-in-law\'s ears. To him he used less terse language. On 4 August he informed King Constantine through the Greek Minister in Berlin that an alliance had that day been concluded between Germany and Turkey, that Bulgaria and Rumania were similarly ranging themselves on Germany\'s side, and that the German men-of-war in the Mediterranean were going to join the Turkish fleet in order to act together. Thus all the Balkan States were siding with Germany in the struggle against Slavism. Would Greece alone stand out ? His Imperial Majesty appealed to King Constantine as a comrade, as a German Field Marshal of whom the German Army was proud, as a brother-in-law; he reminded him that it was thanks to his support that Greece was allowed to retain Cavalla; he begged him to mobilize his army, place himself by the Kaiser\'s side and march hand in hand against the common enemy—-Slavism. He made this urgent appeal for the last time, convinced that the King of Greece would respond to it. If not, all would be over between the two countries—-this being a slightly attenuated version of another marginal note : \"I will treat Greece as an enemy if she does not adhere at once.\" King Constantine\'s answer was tactful but final: His personal sympathies and his political opinions, he said, were on the Kaiser\'s side. But alas ! that which the Kaiser asked him to do was completely out of the question. Greece could not under any conceivable circumstances side against the Entente : the Mediterranean was at the mercy of the united French and British fleets, which could destroy the Greek marine, both royal and mercantile, take the Greek islands, and wipe Greece off the map. Things being so, neutrality, he declared, was the only policy for Greece, and he ended up by meeting the Kaiser\'s threat with a counter-threat, none the less pointed for being veiled under the guise of an \" assurance not to touch his friends among my neighbours (i.e. Bulgaria and Turkey) as long as they do not touch our local Balkan interests.\"
Germany did not immediately resign herself to this rebuff. The Kaiser\'s Government thought King Constantine\'s attachment to neutrality reasonable—for the present; but at the same time urged Greece to enter as soon as possible into a secret understanding with Bulgaria and Turkey for eventual action against Servia, describing the latter country as the bear\'s skin of which it would be a good stroke of business for Greece to secure a share. The German Minister at Athens, better acquainted with Greek views and feelings, took a less naive line. He did not want Greece to attack her ally, but was content to advise that she should free herself from the ties that bound her to Servia, and in the event of Bulgarian aggression just leave her ally in the lurch. But, if he went less far than his chief in one direction, he went farther in another, threatening, should Greece move on Servia\'s behalf, to ask for his passport. This threat, like all the others, failed to move the Athens Government ; and, unable to gain Greece as an ally, Germany was henceforth glad enough not to have her as an enemy.
So far all those responsible for the policy of Greece appeared to be unanimous in the decision not to be drawn prematurely into the European cataclysm, but to reserve her forces for the defence of the Balkan equilibrium. Under this apparent unanimity, however, lay divergent tendencies.
King Constantine, a practical soldier, estimated that the European War would be of long duration and doubtful issue : in this battle of giants he saw no profit for pygmies, but only perils. At the same time, he did not forget that Greece had in Bulgaria and Turkey two embittered enemies who would most probably try to fish in the troubled waters. If they did so, he was prepared to fight; but to fight with a definite objective and on a definite military plan which took into account the elements of time, place, and resources.
The King\'s standpoint was shared by most Greek statesmen and soldiers of note : they all, in varying degrees, stood for neutrality, with possible intervention on the side of the Entente at some favourable moment. But it did not commend itself to his Premier. Caution was foreign to M. Venizelos\'s ambitious and adventurous temperament. Military considerations had little meaning for his civilian mind. Taking the speedy victory of the Entente as a foregone conclusion, and imbued with a soft of mystical faith in his own prophetic insight and star, he looked upon the European War as an occasion for Imperialist aggrandizement which he felt that Greece ought to grasp without an instant\'s delay.
It was not long before the underlying divergence came to the surface.
In the morning of 18 August, at a full Cabinet Meeting, M. Streit mentioned that the Russian Minister had privately referred to the possibility of Greece sending 150,000 men to fight with Servia against the Austrians on the Danube —far away from the Greek Army\'s natural base in Macedonia. On hearing this M. Venizelos impulsively declared that he was ready to place all the Greek forces at the disposal of the Entente Powers in accordance with their invitation. M. Streit remonstrated that there had been no \" invitation,\" but at most a sounding from one of the Entente Ministers, which Greece should meet with a counter-sounding, in order to learn to what extent the suggestion was serious. Further, he objected that, before Greece committed herself, it was necessary to find out where she would be expected to fight, the conditions under which she would fight, and the compensations which she would receive in the event of victory. As a last resort he proposed to adjourn the discussion until the afternoon. But M. Venizelos answered that there was no time to lose : the War would be over in three weeks. Whereupon M. Streit resigned, and M. Venizelos offered to the Entente Ministers the adhesion of Greece forthwith.
The terms in which this offer was couched have never been divulged; but from the French Minister\'s descriptions of it as made \" a titre gracieux \" and \" sans conditions,\" it seems to have been unconditional and unqualified. On the other hand, M. Venizelos at a later period explained that he had offered to place Greece at the disposal of the Entente Powers, if Turkey went to war with them.2 And it is not improbable that the primary objective in his mind was Turkey, who still refused to relinquish her claims to the islands conquered by the Greeks in 1912, and had just strengthened her navy with two German units, the Goeben and the Breslau. However that may be, King Constantine seconded the offer, expressing himself quite willing to join the Entente there and then with the whole of his army, but stipulating, on the advice of the General Staff, that the Greek forces should not be moved to any place where they could not, if need arose, operate against Bulgaria.
The King of England telegraphed to the King of Greece, thanking him for the proposal, which, he said, his Government would consider. The French and Russian Governments expressed lively satisfaction, France, however, adding: \" For the moment we judge that Greece must use all her efforts to make Turkey observe her promised neutrality, and to avoid anything that might lead the Turkish Government to abandon its neutrality.\" The British answer, when it came at last, was to the same effect: England wished by all means to avoid a collision with Turkey and advised that Greece also should avoid a collision. She only suggested for the present an understanding between the Staffs with a view to eventual action.
This suggestion was apparently a concession to Mr. Winston Churchill, who just then had formed the opinion that Turkey would join the Central Powers, and had arranged with Lord Kitchener that two officers of the Admiralty should meet two officers of the War Office to work out a plan for the seizure, by means of a Greek army, of the Gallipoli Peninsula, with a view to admitting a British fleet to the Sea of Marmara. But it no way affected the British Government\'s policy. The utmost that England and France were prepared to do in order to meet the offer of Greece, and that only if she were attacked, was to prevent the Turkish fleet from coming out of the Dardanelles ; France also holding out some hope of financial assistance, but none of war material on an adequate scale.
Such a reception of his advances was not very flattering to M. Venizelos—it made him look foolish in the eyes of those who had pleaded against precipitancy; and he took the earliest opportunity to vent his ill-humour. King Constantine, in a reply to the British Admiralty drafted with Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, stated that he would not fight Turkey unless attacked by her—a statement in strict consonance with the wishes of the Entente Powers at the time. But M. Venizelos objected. After his own declarations to the Entente Ministers, and after the exchange of telegrams with the King of England, he told his sovereign he did not consider this reply possible. Turkey was their enemy, and was it wise for them to reject a chance of fighting her with many and powerful allies, so that they might eventually have to fight her single-handed ?
Thus M. Venizelos argued, in the face of express evidence that those allies did not desire the immediate participation of Greece in a war against Turkey—because, anxious above all things to establish close contact with them, he wanted the offer to remain open : \"a promise that, should at any time the Powers consider us useful in a war against Turkey ... we would be at their disposal.\" And he professed himself unable to understand how a course which appeared so clear to him could possibly be obscure to others. But he had a theory—a theory which served him henceforward as a stock explanation of every difference of opinion, and in which the political was skilfully mixed with the personal factor. According to this theory, when face to face with M. Venizelos, the King seldom failed to be convinced; but as soon as M. Venizelos withdrew, he changed his mind. This happened not once, but many times. We have here a question of psychology which cannot be casually dismissed. M. Venizelos\'s persuasive powers are notorious, and it is highly probable that King Constantine underwent the fascination which this man had for others. But behind it all, according to the Venizelist theory, lurked another element:
\"What, I think, confuses things and begets in the mind of your Majesty and of M. Streit tendencies opposed to those supported by me, is the wish not to displease Germany by undertaking a war against Turkey in co-operation with Powers hostile to her.\" Although M. Streit had laid down his portfolio, he continued to be consulted by the King, with the result, M. Venizelos complained, that the difference of opinions between the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself was fast developing into a divergence of courses between the Crown and the Cabinet: such a state of things was obviously undesirable, and M. Venizelos, \"in order to facilitate the restoration of full harmony between the Crown and its responsible advisers,\" offered his resignation.
M. Venizelos did not resign after all. But his letter marks an epoch none the less. At first, as we have seen, t lie avowed policy of the Premier, of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the King was the same. The difference which now emerges is that M. Venizelos desired to throw Greece into the War immediately, without conditions and without any invitation from the Entente, while the King and M. Streit were more circumspect. M. Venizelos chose to interpret their circumspection as prompted by regard for Germany, and did not hesitate to convey this view to Entente quarters. It was, perhaps, a plausible insinuation, since the King had a German wife and M. Streit was of German descent. But, as a matter of fact, at the moment when it was made, King Constantine voluntarily presented to the British Admiralty through Admiral Kerr the plans for the taking of the Dardanelles which his Staff had elaborated, and for a l0ng time afterwards continued to supply the British Government, through the same channel, with information from his secret service.
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Details of the various postage options (for example, First Class, First Class Recorded, Second Class and/or Parcel Post if the item is heavy) can be obtained by selecting the “Postage and payments” option at the head of this listing (above).
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Payment can be made by: debit card, credit card (Visa or MasterCard, but not Amex), cheque (payable to \"G Miller\", please), or PayPal.
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Please contact me with name, address and payment details within seven days of the end of the sale; otherwise I reserve the right to cancel the sale and re-list the item.
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Finally, this should be an enjoyable experience for both the buyer and seller and I hope you will find me very easy to deal with. If you have a question or query about any aspect (postage, payment, delivery options and so on), please do not hesitate to contact me, using the contact details provided at the end of this listing.
International buyers:
To estimate the “packed weight” each book is first weighed and then an additional amount of 150 grams is added to allow for the packaging material (all books are securely wrapped and posted in a cardboard book-mailer). The weight of the book and packaging is then rounded up to the nearest hundred grams to arrive at the shipping figure. I make no charge for packaging materials and do not seek to profit from shipping and handling.
Shipping can usually be combined for multiple purchases (to a maximum of 5 kilograms in any one parcel with the exception of Canada, where the limit is 2 kilograms).
Packed weight of this item : approximately 600 grams
International Shipping options:Details of the postage options to various countries (via Air Mail) can be obtained by selecting the “Postage and payments” option at the head of this listing (above) and then selecting your country of residence from the drop-down list. For destinations not shown or other requirements, please contact me before offerding. Tracked and \"Signed For\" services are also available if required, but at an additional charge to that shown on the Postage and payments page, which is for ordinary uninsured Air Mail delivery.
Due to the extreme length of time now taken for deliveries, surface mail is no longer a viable option and I am unable to offer it even in the case of heavy items. I am afraid that I cannot make any exceptions to this rule.
Payment options for international buyers:-
Payment can be made by: credit card (Visa or MasterCard, but not Amex) or PayPal. I can also accept a cheque in GBP [British Pounds Sterling] but only if drawn on a major British bank.
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Regretfully, due to extremely high conversion charges, I CANNOT accept foreign currency : all payments must be made in GBP [British Pounds Sterling]. This can be accomplished easily using a credit card, which I am able to accept as I have a separate, well-established business, or PayPal.
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Please contact me with your name and address and payment details within seven days of the end of the sale; otherwise I reserve the right to cancel the sale and re-list the item.
-
Finally, this should be an enjoyable experience for both the buyer and seller and I hope you will find me very easy to deal with. If you have a question or query about any aspect (shipping, payment, delivery options and so on), please do not hesitate to contact me, using the contact details provided at the end of this listing.
Prospective international buyers should ensure that they are able to provide credit card details or pay by PayPal within 7 days from the end of the sale (or inform me that they will be sending a cheque in GBP drawn on a major British bank). Thank you.
(please note that the book shown is for illustrative purposes only and forms no part of this sale)
Book dimensions are given in inches, to the nearest quarter-inch, in the format width x height.
Please note that, to differentiate them from soft-covers and paperbacks, modern hardbacks are still invariably described as being ‘cloth’ when they are, in fact, predominantly bound in paper-covered boards pressed to resemble cloth.
Fine Books for Fine Minds
I value your custom (and my response rating) but I am also a bibliophile : I want books to arrive in the same condition in which they were dispatched. For this reason, all books are securely wrapped in tissue and a protective covering and are then posted in a cardboard container. If any book is significantly not as described, I will offer a full refund. Unless the size of the book precludes this, hardback books with a dust-jacket are usually provided with a clear film protective cover, while hardback books without a dust-jacket are usually provided with a rigid clear cover.
The Royal Mail, in my experience, offers an excellent service, but things can occasionally go wrong. However, I believe it is my responsibility to guarantee delivery. If any book is lost or damaged in transit, I will offer a full refund.
Thank you for looking.
Please also view my other listings for a range of interesting books
and feel free to contact me if you require any additional information
Design and content © Geoffrey Miller
GREECE AND THE ALLIES 1914-1922 DARDANELLES Constantine VENIZELOS Turkey BALKANS:
$217.89